Western New England Law Review
Volume 18 18 (1996)
Issue 1 SYMPOSIUM: INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES

Article 12

1-1-1996

CRIMINAL LAW—STATE OF
CONNECTICUT v. JOYCE: WHO GETS
BURNED BY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
OF FIRE-DAMAGED CLOTHING?
Andrew S. Golden

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Andrew S. Golden, CRIMINAL LAW—STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOYCE: WHO GETS BURNED BY THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH OF FIRE-DAMAGED CLOTHING?, 18 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 305 (1996), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/
vol18/iss1/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

CRIMINAL

LAW-STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. JOYCE:

WHO

GETS BURNED BY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF FIRE-DAMAGED
CLOTHING?

INTRODUCfION

Under the community caretaking function, police frequently
collect and store personal property that is exposed to possible loss,
damage, or theft.! Upon discovering property in danger of such
perils, police often confiscate and hold the property until it can be
returned to its proper owner. Because this acquisition is in no way
intended to collect evidence of crime, but simply to protect the pub
lic's property, the police are not required to obtain a warrant before
seizing the property.2 Once such property is seized under the com
munity caretaking function, it is less clear what limits should be
placed upon the police regarding the property, and whether a war
rant is required to permit the search of such property.3
State v. Joyce 4 raised just such an issue. In Joyce, the Connecti
cut State Police secured a fire victim's burnt clothing pursuant to
their community caretaking function. Without procuring a warrant,
the police then shipped the clothing to a state forensic laboratory
for chemical analysis, which showed traces of gasoline on the vic
tim's clothing. At trial, the defendant was convicted of arson in the
first degree,S from which he appealed, claiming that the court erred
in failing to exclude the evidence of gasoline traces, evidence which
resulted from an illegal, warrantless search. The Connecticut Ap
pellate Court affirmed the lower court's conviction and certiorari
1. See, e.g., State v. "fully, 348 A.2d 603, 609 (Conn. 1974) (for purpose of safe
keeping, police pennitted under community caretaking function to confiscate a guitar
from an abandoned parked car).
2. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (searches that are "totally di
vorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the viola
tion of a criminal statute" fall under the pOlice's community caretaking function, and
are not subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement).
3. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regula
tions: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REv. 442, 460 n.107 (1990) (explaining that no warrant is
required for inventory searches because such searches fall under the police's commu
nity caretaking function).
4. 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994).
5. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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was granted by the Connecticut Supreme Court. The court was re
quired to determine whether the police, having lawfully obtained
custodial possession of the defendant's burnt clothing, nevertheless
were required under article first, section 7 of the Connecticut Con
stitution6 to obtain a search warrant before performing a chemical
analysis on the clothing.? The court held that a search warrant was
indeed required.s
The concern in Joyce focused upon whether the defendant pos
sessed an interest in the burnt clothing protected by article first,
section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution.9 Analyzing this issue,
the Connecticut Supreme Court concentrated on whether the de
fendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the burnt
clothing. 10
The controversy presented in Joyce had never been addressed
by the Connecticut Supreme Court nor by any other state or federal
court. Thus, the Joyce opinions raise novel and interesting ques
tions regarding a person's expectation of privacy. For example,
does the damaged nature of the burnt clothing render it unpro
tected? Specifically, is burnt clothing analogous to curbside gar
bage, which can never be the object of a legitimate expectation of
privacy no matter what steps the "owner" took to manifest such an
expectation?l1 Is burnt clothing analogous to a burned-out build
ing, which generally receives constitutional protection as long as an
expectation of privacy is manifested in the burnt remains by the
owner?12 Is burnt clothing analogous to illegal contraband, which
can never itself be the object of a legitimate expectation of privacy
6. CONN. CONST. art. first, § 7 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place,
or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly
as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
Id.
7. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1009.
8. Id. at 1017.
9. See supra note 6.
10. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1013 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing a two part subjective/objective test to determine
whether an individual exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy). See infra part I.B
for a discussion of the Katz test.
11. See, e~g., State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 753 (Conn. 1993) (narcotics defend
ant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage he placed at curbside for
pickup).
12. See, e.g., State v. Zindros, 456 A.2d 288, 296-97 (Conn. 1983) (lessee of build
ing sufficiently demonstrated that he still possessed legitimate expectation of privacy in
building eleven days after it was destroyed by fire), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).

1996]

WHO GETS BURNED?

307

because it is the instrument of a crime?13 Finally, assuming that
.none of the above categorical characterizations disqualifies a de
fendant's constitutional protection, does the defendant relinquish
his expectation of privacy via abandonment when the burnt cloth
ing is left behind at the accident scene and secured by the police
under the community caretaking function?14 This Note will analyze
and critique the Joyce decision in an attempt to provide an answer
to these questions.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the Katz v.
United States 15 test. It also explains how the Katz test has been
applied in three related Connecticut Supreme Court cases. 16
Part II presents the facts of Joyce and examines the reasoning
behind the decisions of the Connecticut Appellate Court1 7 and the
Connecticut Supreme Court. 18 Particular attention is paid to the
divergence between the majority and dissenting opinions of the
Connecticut Supreme Court decision regarding the defendant's ex
pectation of privacy.
Part III analyzes Joyce in terms of the four narrow questions
presented above. Specifically, it evaluates whether the defendant's
burnt clothing is most analogous to garbage, burned-out buildings,
or illegal contraband, and whether the defendant, regardless of any
categorical protection, nevertheless abandoned any expectation of
13. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (test that indi
cates the presence of cocaine does not violate legitimate expectation of privacy); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (no expectation of privacy in marijuana de
tected by dog sniff); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that society
is not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence).
14. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (after defendant had
checked out of hotel, papers discovered in wastebasket of his room were not protected
by Fourth Amendment); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 159 (Conn.) (stating that aban
donment requires the relinquishment of an expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 919 (1991). See also Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of
Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REv. 399,
400 (1970) ("[W]here one abandons property, he is said to bring his right of privacy
therein to an end ...."); David H. Steinberg, Note, Constructing Homes for the Home
less? Searching for a Fourth Amendment Standard. 41 DUKE L.J. 1508, 1529 (1992)
("One cannot manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item once it has been
abandoned.").
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 750 (Conn. 1993) (Katz test applied to curb
side garbage); Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152 (Katz test applied to abandoned property);
State v. Zindros, 456 A.2d 288, 294 (Conn. 1983) (Katz test applied to burned-out build
ing), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
17. State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
18. State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994).
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privacy he may have possessed in the clothing, leaving it devoid of
any constitutional protection.
Finally, this Note concludes that an expectation of privacy in
burnt clothing is similar to that of a burned-out building in that the
severity of the burnt condition plays a significant role in determin
ing whether society will consider an expectation of privacy in the
remains reasonable; that the defendant in Joyce indeed possessed a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the burnt clothing; and that a
search warrant should have been procured before the chemical
analysis was performed. In sum, because the defendant in Joyce
possessed a protected interest in his burnt clothing, the Connecticut
Supreme Court made the correct decision to exclude all evidence
obtained through a warrantless search.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Balancing State and Federal Constitutional Protection
It is well established that an individual state, when interpreting

its own state constitution, can make use of federal precedents that
are logically reasonable and persuasive. 19 Consistent with this prac
tice, the Connecticut Supreme Court has repeatedly chosen to look
to federal precedent when deciding cases interpreting the liberties
afforded to its citizens by the Connecticut Constitution.20 Thus, in
evaluating the constitutional issue raised in State v. Joyce, the Con
necticut Supreme Court elected to utilize the same analytical
framework that would be used under the United States Constitu
tion. 21 The court, however, pointed out that the adoption of such a
framework does "not compel [it] ... to reach the same outcome
that a federal court might reach when the methodology is applied to
a particular set of factual circumstances. "22
19. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); see also Justice William J.
Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489, 502 (1977):
[S]tate court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional
decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive
and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying
specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight
as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.
Id.
20. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1013.
21. Id. at 1012.
22. Id. at 1012 n.12. While the United States Constitution sets a minimum na
tionallevel of guaranteed individual rights, its assertions have never been interpreted as
maximum levels that may not be exceeded by a particular state's constitution. Thus,

1996]

WHO GETS BURNED?

309

B. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

In its 1967 landmark decision, Katz v. United States,23 the
United States Supreme Court determined that the government's
electronic eavesdropping of a telephone call Katz made from a pub
lic phone booth violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 24 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects
what a person intends to preserve as private25 and that the defend
ant, Katz, had intended the phone call he made to be a private con
versation heard only by himself and the person he had called. 26 The
Court further determined that Katz's privacy expectation was ob
jectively reasonable, since most people making a call from inside a
telephone booth with the doors pulled closed would expect their
conversation to be private. 27 Katz's reliance on this expectation of
privacy was thereby justifiable and required the Constitution's pro
tection accordingly.28 Thus, the Court created a subjective/objec
tive judicial requisite for Fourth Amendment protection, requiring
individuals may be afforded more protection in a particular circumstance under their
state constitution where similar rights would not exist under the United States Constitu
tion. See Cologne v. Westfarrns Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1206 (Conn. 1984) (holding
that a group of individuals was afforded access to private shopping center property to
engage in free speech under the Connecticut Constitution even though no similar right
is afforded by the United States Constitution). The Connecticut Supreme Court, there
fore, is free to grant its citizens a higher level of protection by interpreting the provi
sions of the Connecticut Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme
Court has under the United States Constitution. See also State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d
1225, 1231 (Conn. 1992); Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63
TEX. L. REv. 959 (1985).
For a historical analysis of the Connecticut Constitution, aimed at assisting attor
neys in bringing state constitutional claims in Connecticut courts, see generally Justice
Robert I. Berdon, An Analytical Framework for Raising State Constitutional Claims in
Connecticut, 14 Q.L.R. 191 (1994).
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was charged with transmitting wagering informa
tion by telephone in violation of federal statute. Without obtaining a warrant, the FBI
obtained evidence of Katz's telephone conversations through the use of an electronic
listening and recording device, which had been secretly attached to the outside of the
public telephone booth from which Katz placed the calls. Id. at 348.
24. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
26. Id. at 352.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 353.
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"[flirst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta
tion of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable."29 Unless both prongs of
this test are satisfied, the individual possesses no legitimate expecta
tion of privacy over the property in question, and no rights are vio
lated by a warrantless search or seizure of such property.30
In 1993, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. DeFusco,31
adopted the Katz test to interpret and apply article first, section 7
of the Connecticut Constitution. 32 The Connecticut Supreme
Court formulated a factor analysis to determine whether the de
fendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage
he had placed by the curbside for collection. The court assessed:
(1) whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy with respect to the property; and (2) whether that expecta
tion is one that society would consider reasonable. 33 By framing its
analysis in this way, the court established a new methodology for
applying article first, section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. 34
C.

Applying the Katz Test

After deciding Katz, the United States Supreme Court faced
the challenge of applying the new rule to a myriad of factual pos
sibilities. 35 As more and more situations were evaluated under
Katz, distinct categories of what would and would not receive pro
tection under the Fourth Amendment began to emerge. For exam
ple, the United States Supreme Court held that individuals'
expectations of privacy in garbage36 and open fields 37 fail the Katz
29. [d. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. Id.
31. 620 A.2d 746, 750 (Conn. 1993).
32. See supra note 6 for language of CONN. CoNST., art. first, § 7.
33. Defusco, 620 A.2d at 750.
34. Id. (U Although we have never addressed the proper standard for detennining
the applicability of article first, § 7, neither party contests the appropriateness of using
the Katz test in this case."); see also Mitchell S. Brody, Developments in Connecticut
Criminal Law: 1992-1993, 68 CoNN. B.J. 37,37-38 (1994) (commenting on the DeFusco
court's interpretation of article first, § 7).
35. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1 (2d ed. 1987); Melvin Guttennan, A Formulation ofthe
Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically En
hanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647 (1988).
36. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that no rea
sonable expectation of privacy exists in one's trash placed at the curbside); Jon E.
Lemole, Note, From Katz to Greenwood: Abandonment Gets Recycled from the Trash
Pile-Can Our Garbage Be Saved from the Court's Rummaging Hands?, 41 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 581 (1991).
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test and are categorically beyond the scope of the Fourth Amend
ment's protection. Similarly, the Court refused to grant protection
to certain instruments of crime or contraband, such as guns 38 or
cocaine,39 reasoning that they failed to meet the Katz requirements.
These types of property interests will not be protected under the
Fourth Amendment regardless of the steps the individual takes to
demonstrate that he or she possessed an expectation of privacy. By
contrast, the Court determined that some property, such as fire
damaged buildings,40 would receive constitutional protection only if
the homeowner actively manifested some measure of seeking pri
vacy. These types of property interests differ from the categorically
excluded ones in that they are denied Fourth Amendment protec
tion because the privacy expectation has not been subjectively man
ifested by the particular defendant.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has similarly created categori
cal applications of the Katz test through its own case law. Three
Connecticut cases are particularly relevant to the controversy raised
in Joyce, each meriting its own analysis.
1.

State v. Zindros 41

On February 12, 1977, a fire caused extensive damage to a
building leased by the defendant, Georgios Zindros.42 The defend
ant operated a pizza parlor from within the building, but the fire
rendered it unfit to conduct business. Eleven days after the fire, a
warrantless search of the burned-out premises produced incriminat
ing evidence of arson against the defendant. 43
The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the defend
ant still possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the build
37. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding that society has
no interest in protecting the privacy of property located in an open field setting); James
Leonard, Note, Criminal Procedure-Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields Doctrine
Survives Katz, 63 N.C. L. REv. 546 (1985).
38. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that society is not prepared
to recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence), reh'g
denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
39. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a field
test which checks specifically for the presence of illegal drugs, but reveals no private
facts about the individual, does not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy).
40. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (holding that a search directed
at determining the cause of a fire of a building requires a search warrant if the owner's
expectation of privacy in the building remains after the fire).
41. 456 A.2d 288 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
42. Id. at 291.
43. Id. at 291-93.
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ing at the time of the search.44 The court reasoned that the
defendant had not abandoned the propertY's and that the building's
burned-out and boarded-up condition did not divest him of a rea
sonable privacy expectation.46 The court further explained that,
during the eleven day period following the fire, the defendant had
manifested an ongoing privacy expectation by securing the premises
each time he visited it. 47 Additionally, the court considered the
value of the personal property left on the premises48 and the de
fendant's intention to repair the premises and reopen the
business.49
2.

State v. MooneySO

The defendant, David Mooney, was a homeless person ar
rested for murder on August 5, 1987.51 Later that night, the police
searched several of the defendant's possessions, including a duffel
bag and a closed cardboard box, which they found unattended
under a highway bridge abutment that the defendant had been us
ing as a home. 52
The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a homeless person could possess a reasonable expectation'
of privacy in property left unattended. 53 The court concluded that
the expectation of privacy in a closed duffel bag and box required
the same special protection provided to "closed containers."54 The
court was unpersuaded that the defendant had forfeited such rights
by abandoning the property under the bridge, since the facts sug
gested that the police were well aware that the defendant regarded
44. Id.
45. Id. The court defined abandonment as "a question of fact ... [that1implies a
voluntary and intentional renunciation, but the intent may be inferred as a fact from the
surrounding circumstances." Id. at 296 (quoting Pizzuto v. Newington, 386 A.2d 238,
240 (Conn. 1978».
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (approximately $6750 worth of equipment remained functional inside the
damaged building).
49. Id.
50. 588 A.2d 145 (Conn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991).
51. Id. at 150.
52. Id. at 150-51.
53. ld. at 154.
54. Id. The court explained that "society has traditionally afforded a high degree
of deference to expectations of privacy in closed containers because such an area is
normally intended as a repository of personal effects." Id. at 160. See United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1. 11 (1977) (holding that a reasonable expectation of privacy ex
isted in a closed footlocker loaded onto a vehicle).
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the site under the bridge as his home. 55
3. State v. DeFusco 56

On October 12, 1990, police officers found illegal narcotics in
side the home of Paul DeFusco. 57 The search was performed pur
suant to a warrant issued upon an affidavit describing suspicious
items that police officers had obtained from garbage placed at the
curbside outside the defendant's home. 58
The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the defendant did
not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed
by the curbside for collection. 59 The court reasoned that when the
defendant placed the garbage at the curb, he left the garbage widely
susceptible to invasion from a variety of intruders, such as munici
pal workers, antique collectors, bottle or coupon redeemers,
snoops, vagrants, and animals, and therefore maintained no reason
able expectation of privacy in the garbage. 60 Thus, the defendant
could not legitimately expect his curbside garbage to remain free
from examination, and the police were not required to obtain a
warrant before searching through it or seizing it. 61
D. Burden of Proving an Unconstitutional Search
Under both the United States and Connecticut constitutions,62
in order to be entitled to the constitutional protection against un
reasonable searches, a defendant must prove that he or she pos
sessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item searched, and
that this expectation was one that society would recognize as rea
sonable. 63 It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that both
prongs of the test were satisfied, and that a warrant, therefore,
should have been procured.64 Whether the defendant has estab
55. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159-60.
56. 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993).
57. Id. at 748.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 753.
60. Id. at 752 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (prior to
DeFusco, the United States Supreme Court reached a nearly identical holding when
presented with a set of facts)}.
61. Id. at 753. See also Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41.
62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Pittman, 553 A.2d 155,
157 (Conn. 1989).
64. State v. Brown, 503 A.2d 566, 569-70 (Conn. 1986). The United States
Supreme Court, however, has created some well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
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lished a reasonable expectation of privacy must be determined on a
case by case basis,65 which mandates a factual inquiry into all the
relevant circumstances. 66
II.

A.

STATE

v.

JOyce6 7

Statement of Facts 68

At approximately 4:00 p.m. on January 29, 1990, fire-fighters
and paramedics responded to a report of a fire at 125 Maple Street,
East Haven, Connecticut.69 Emergency medical technician Charles
Licata arrived at the location to find the residence in flames and the
defendant, Wallace Joyce, standing waist deep in a nearby river, ap
parently severely bumed.7° Licata assisted Joyce out of the river
and onto its embankment. Joyce was seriously injured, with first,
second, and third degree bums covering 42 percent of his body.71
To best treat Joyce's wounds and prevent infection, Licata de
cided to cut off the smoldering clothing that remained on Joyce's
body.72 Licata laid the charred remains of clothing on the ground
and immediately proceeded to clean and dress Joyce's wounds and
provide appropriate emergency first-aid. Joyce was then trans
ported by ambulance to Yale-New Haven Hospital.73
Following the ambulance's departure from the scene of the
requirement. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent excep
tion); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest exception);
Dyke v. Taylor Implementing Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) (plain view search excep
tion); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances exception); Car
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile search exception). For a more
detailed summary on the warrant requirement and its exceptions, see Darrel C. Waugh,
Note, Developing Guidelines in Fourth Amendment "Clothing Cases" After United
States v. Butler, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 289,291-95 (1994).
65. State v. Reddick, 541 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Conn. 1988).
66. State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 152, (Conn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991).
67. 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994).
68. The statement of facts presented in this section was compiled by interweaving
the records presented respectively in the Connecticut Supreme Court opinion, State v.
Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994), and the Connecticut Appellate Court opinion, State
v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). While the factual records in these two
opinions are consistent with one another, each provides significantly more detail than
the other in particular sections. In an attempt to minimize confusion to the reader,
footnotes have been provided to mark switches from one source to the other.
69. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 874. The property formerly had been owned by the de
fendant's father, who approximately nine months previously had passed away leaving a
life tenancy in the house to the defendant's sister and her son. Id. at 874 n.2.
70. Id. at 874.
71. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1009.
72. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 875 n.5.
73. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1009-10.
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fire, East Haven Police Detective Bruce Scobie, acting under the
police's community caretaking function,74 secured Joyce's clothing,
placed it in the trunk of his cruiser, and brought it to the police
department.75 Scobie later testified that he took possession of the
clothing so that it "wouldn't be stolen or 10st."76
Licata and East Haven Police Detective Paul Hemingway ac
companied Joyce to the hospital in the ambulance. 77 Along the
way, Licata briefly questioned Joyce regarding the fire,78 Joyce in
dicated that he h~d gone to the house "to check on something,"
that he had "opened the door," and that "there had been an explo
sion."79 He could not recall whether he had been blown from the
house or whether he ran into the river.80
After they arrived at the emergency room of the hospital,
Hemingway questioned Joyce. 8! Joyce repeated the information he
had told Licata while in the ambulance earlier.82 Hemingway con
tinued to interrogate Joyce, but Joyce's medical condition left him
unable to respond. 83 Hemingway informed Joyce's wife, who had
been called to the hospital and was present for the questioning, that
the police "had [Joyce's] burnt clothing and wallet," which she
could pick up at the East Haven Police Department. 84
Later that night, at the police department, detectives Scobie
74. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court determined that the police have a
duty to protect property exposed to possible loss, damage, or theft. See Cady v. Dom
browski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). The Court characterized this duty as the police's
"community caretaking function." Id. In such instances, it becomes unnecessary for
the police to obtain a warrant before confiscating such property and holding it in custo
dial possession until it can be returned to the original owner.
The Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the policy of "community caretaking" in
1974. See State v. Thlly, 348 A.2d 603, 608 (Conn. 1974). Connecticut's policy was
borrowed directly from Cady: "'Local police officers ... frequently ... engage in what,
for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the
violation of a criminal statute.'" Id. at 609 (alteration in original) (quoting Cady, 413
U.S. at 441).
75. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 875.
76. Id.
77. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1010.
78. Id.
79. Id.
SO. Id.
8l. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Although Joyce's wife picked up the wallet the next day, no attempt was
ever made by either Joyce or his wife to retrieve the clothing until just prior to Joyce's
trial when the motion to suppress evidence was made. Id. at 1009.
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and Hemingway inventoried Joyce's clothing and wallet. 85 The of
ficers then dried, tagged, bagged, and stored Joyce's property in a
closet at the police station. 86 The trial court found that in taking
custody of Joyce's clothing, the police had acted appropriately pur
suant to their community caretaking function. 87
The following day, January 30, 1990, as a result of ongoing in
vestigation, Joyce became an arson suspect. 88 Detective Scobie
then gave Joyce's unclaimed clothing to Fire Marshall Frederick
Brow, who immediately transported it to the state forensic labora
tory in Meriden for chemical testing. 89 Brow did not obtain a
search warrant before ordering the chemical analysis of the
clothing. 90
At the forensic laboratory, gas chromatography analysis re
vealed traces of gasoline on Joyce's clothing. 91 Carpet and wood
samples taken from the house by police also tested positive for the
presence of gasoline. 92 The clothing was later returned to the East
Haven police department.
Mter extended hospitalization, Joyce was charged with two
counts of arson in the first degree under Connecticut General Stat
utes sections 53a-111(a)(3) and 53a-111(a)(4).93 Prior to trial, Joyce
85. Id. at 1010.
86. Both Scobie and Hemingway claimed that, at this point, Joyce was not sus
pected of starting the fire. Scobie explained that his intention in securing the clothing
was to return it to its owner, and that he had been following "customary procedure for
safekeeping property." Id.
f57. Id. (citing State v. Thlly, 348 A.2d 603, 608-09 (Conn. 1974». The Joyce court
pointed out that neither party challenged this finding on appeal. Id.
88. Id. The record is unclear as to what change in circumstance led to Joyce's
becoming a suspect between January 29 and January 30,1990.
89. Id. Brow actually delivered Joyce's clothing to the laboratory in two separate
trips. For reasons that do not appear in the record, Joyce's undershirt and dungarees
were left out of the first conveyance of clothing and were transported separately, by
Brow, two days later. Id.
90. Id. A search warrant was obtained several days later to seize Joyce's pickup
truck, which had been parked a short distance from the scene of the fire. Id.
91. Id. At trial, the head of the chemistry department at the state forensic labora
tory, Jack Hubball, presented the exact scientific method used on Joyce's clothing.
Hubball explained that the distillation procedure used in the analysis involved heating
Joyce's clothing to vaporize all organic materials and separating the vapor into individ
ual chemical compounds by their distinct boiling points. Computer printouts of the
identified compounds were then compared with the signature patterns of known or
ganic substances. The signature pattern of gasoline was identified as present in Joyce's
shirt, shoes, socks, and jeans. Id.
92. Id. at 1010 n.3.
93. Id. at 1009. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-ll1 (1995) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy
or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-roO, he starts a fire or causes
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moved to suppress the results of the chemical analysis of his cloth
ing, but the court rejected the motion. 94 A jury convicted Joyce of
arson in the first degree in violation of section 53a-ll1(a)(4) and
acquitted him of the charge under section 53a-111(a)(3).95 Joyce
was sentenced to a twelve year jail term, suspended after four years,
fined $5,000, and placed on five years probation. 96 On appeal, the
Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, with one
judge dissenting.97
B.

The Connecticut Appellate Court's Decision
1. The Majority Opinion

Writing for the majority, Judge O'Connell first recognized that
the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's expectations of
both "freedom from unreasonable searches and freedom from un
reasonable seizures."98 .Thus, the court divided Joyce's claim into
the following sub-issues: (1) whether Joyce's clothing was illegally
seized; and (2) whether transporting the clothing to the state foren
sic laboratory or conducting a chemical analysis of it once present
at the laboratory constituted an illegal search. 99
In analyzing whether the clothing was illegally seized, the court
first established that the police originally obtained the clothing in a
legal manner, pursuant to their community caretaking function. lOo
Having found that the police had legal custodial possession of the
clothing, the majority next reasoned that no warrant was needed
before transferring it to the forensic laboratory, because such a rean explosion, and ... (3) such fire or explosion was caused for the purpose of
collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss; or (4) at the scene of such
fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk
of bodily injury.
Id.
94. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1009.
95. Id. See supra note 93 for the language of the statute.
96. Id.
97. State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (Heiman, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 876 (citing Horton v. California, 496 u.S. 128, 133 (1990); United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984». Because the defendant did not make any argu
ments specifically under the Connecticut Constitution, the appellate court chose to ana
lyze his complaint exclusively under the United States Constitution. Id. at 876 n.7.
99. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 876. The court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's definitions of search and seizure. "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' of prop
erty occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interests in that property." Id. (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113).
100. Id. at 876 (citing State v. Thlly, 348 A.2d 603, 608-09 (Conn. 1974»; see supra
note 74 for an explanation of the community caretaking function.
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quirement would place an "unwieldy burden" on the police that
could not be justifiably balanced by any "concomitant benefit to the
owner of the property."101 Thus, the court concluded that no illegal
seizure had taken place. 102 The court reasoned that transferring the
clothing to the laboratory created no additional interference with
Joyce's possessory interest in the clothing. 103 More specifically,
since Joyce was never denied access to the clothing, the court deter
mined that the police did not restrict his right to exercise dominion
and control over the clothing. 104
To begin the next step of determining whether the chemical
analysis of Joyce's clothing constituted an illegal search, the major
ity asserted that it is not enough that the defendant possess an ex
pectation of privacy, but that he must actually exhibit this
expectation. 105 Thus, the majority opined that although Joyce may
have maintained ownership of his clothing while the police held it
in custody, he failed to exhibit the necessary expectation of privacy
after the police took possession of it. The court reasoned that
"[m]ere ownership ... does not demonstrate a reasonable expecta
tion of privacy," and that a person may "retain a property interest
in an item, but nonetheless . . . relinquish his or her reasonable
expectation of privacy in the object."106
The court recognized that a reasonable expectation of privacy
is usually presumed in the clothing people wear, but the court de
termined that this presumption does not apply to clothing that is so
badly damaged by 'fire that it is "no longer usable as clothing. "107
The court also asserted that an erosion of privacy necessarily re
sulted from the fact that the clothing had been removed from
Joyce's body without his resistance and left in a public place until
secured by the police. lOS Based on these arguments, the court con
cluded that Joyce "had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
101. Joyce, 619 A,2d at 876. The court asserted that to hold otherwise would
result in a policy where, regarding property in the lawful possession of the police, "a
seizure would arise each time something happens to that property thereby requiring a
new warrant." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 877 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967» (defendant
exhibited a privacy expectation by closing the doors to the phone booth); see supra note
29 and accompanying text.
106. Joyce, 619 A,2d at 877 (quoting State v. Mooney, 588 A,2d 145, 158 (Conn.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991».
107. Id. at 877-78.
108. Id. at 878 (citing Wagner V. Hedrick, 383 S.E.2d 286 (W. Va. 1989».
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clothing."109
The court concluded that even if there had been a seizure and
Joyce had exhibited an expectation of privacy, the chemical analysis
of the clothing would not have constituted a search.110 Relying on
United States v. Jacobsen,111 the court concluded that such a "mini
mally intrusive examination of the remnants of [Joyce's] clothing to
determine whether it contained an accelerant was not a search
within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment ."112
2.

The Dissenting Opinion

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Heiman disagreed with the ma
jority's determination that transferring the clothing to the forensic
laboratory to administer a chemical analysis did not constitute a
seizure for which a warrant should have been required. 113
Although he agreed that the community caretaking function al
lowed the police to secure Joyce's clothing initially,1l4 Judge Hei
man asserted that transferring the clothing to the laboratory
effectively ended the police's community caretaking services and
constituted an unlawful seizure.llS He stated that the community
caretaking function "cannot be used as a ruse or as a substitute for
obtaining a warrant in order to seize an item for investigatory
purposes."116
Such a seizure, which the dissent argued created an interfer
ence with Joyce's possessory interests, required a warrant. Thus,
the dissent concluded that the absence of such a warrant created a
warrantless seizure for investigatory purposes, and that Joyce's
109. [d. The court noted that its analysis was not intended to suggest that the
expectation was one which society would recognize as reasonable. That issue was not
brought up in Joyce's appellate brief and was not addressed by the appellate court. [d.
at 878 n.14.
110. [d. at 878-79.
111. 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (stating that a search under the Fourth Amendment
requires revealment of some private facts about an individual); see infra note 136 and
accompanying text.
112. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 878. Addressing additional issues argued on appeal, the
appellate court majority opinion further held that: (1) the trial court was correct in
refusing to admit evidence of arson against Joyce's nephew on grounds of relevancy, id.
at 880-81; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction against Joyce, id.
at 882-83. These two issues were not addressed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut
and are outside the scope of this Note.
113. [d. at 883 (Heiman, J., dissenting).
114. [d. See supra note 74 for explanation of the police's community caretaking
function.
115. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 883.
116.

[d.
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Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.!17
C.

The Connecticut Supreme Court's Decision 118

The Connecticut Supreme Court granted Joyce's petition for
certiorari limited to the following issue: "In the circumstances of
this case, were the police, while lawfully in custodial possession of
the defendant's clothing, required by either the federal or state con
stitution to obtain a warrant before transferring the clothing to a
state laboratory and subjecting it to chemical analysis?"119
1.

The Majority Opinion

In order to decide whether the results of the chemical analysis
of Joyce's clothing should have been suppressed under Connecti
cut's exclusionary rule,120 the court was required to decide: "(1)
117. Id. at 884-85. The dissent also criticized the majority's argument that Joyce
failed to exhibit an expectation of privacy over the clothing, considering the particular
factual circumstances of the case. Judge Heiman characterized it as "somewhat disin
genuous and Orwellian" to reason that an accident victim relinquishes his expectation
of privacy over clothing that is removed from his person by police and medical person
nel, or that the same victim should be required to reassert his expectation of privacy
while laying in a hospital bed recovering from a life-threatening accident. Id. at 883 n.3.
118. State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994).
119. Id. at 1009 n.2. The court suggested that numerous federal opinions have
held that the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibits police from
freely searching undamaged property in their community caretaking custody. See, e.g.,
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727
(1877)). However, the Joyce court noted that neither the United States Supreme Court,
nor any federal circuit, had ever addressed the type of facts presented in Joyce, where in
addition to being held under the community caretaking function, the property in ques
tion was damaged as well. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1011 n.6. Nevertheless, because Joyce
claimed a violation of the Connecticut Constitution as well as the United States Consti
tution, the court stated that its decision only reached the state claim, but not the federal
claim. Id.
As was noted by the Connecticut Court of Appeals, Joyce failed to analyze and
outline his state constitutional claim in his appellate brief. Under such circumstances,
the Joyce court reaffirmed that it is not bound to review the state claim. Id. at 1011-12
(citing State v. Birch, 594 A.2d 972 (Conn. 1991)). The Supreme Court of Connecticut,
however, has never precluded itself from reviewing a state constitutional claim omitted
in an appellate brief and reasoned that it may do so under the appropriate circum
stances. Thus, the Joyce court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, it
was appropriate to review the defendant's state constitutional claim. Id. at 1012.
120. Connecticut's exclusionary rule is a judicially created policy which prevents
the use of evidence that the police obtained in violation of article first, § 7 of the Con
necticut Constitution. State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 17-21 (Conn. 1988) (recognizing
such a policy is an effective remedy for enforcement of the constitutional protection
against unconstitutional searches and seizures."). See also Bruce R. Lockwood, Note,
Connecticut Search & Seizure Law: The Connecticut Supreme Court Should Adopt a
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule to Article First, Section 7, o/the Connect
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whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloth
ing; (2) whether the testing of the clothing at the state laboratory
constituted a search; and (3) if so, whether the circumstances of this
case fall within a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. "121
Writing for the majority, Justice Berdon explained that in or
der to determine whether Joyce had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the clothing, a two-part subjective/objective test must be
satisfied, evaluating both whether Joyce manifested a subjective ex
pectation of privacy regarding the clothing and whether society
would consider that expectation reasonable,122
Justice Berdon's opinion first stated that Connecticut case law
has consistently held that a person generally possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy in clothing that he or she wears.123 The State
advanced several arguments, each asserting that the facts of this
case created an exception to this general rule and that Joyce's rea
sonable expectation of privacy had been extinguished, but the Joyce
majority was unpersuaded by these arguments,124
The majority also rejected the State's argument that if the de
fendant possessed an expectation of privacy, such an expectation
was forfeited because he failed to exhibit any manifestation of it.125
The majority reasoned that to require Joyce to have exhibited his
expectation of privacy while he "lay in the hospital near death"
icut Constitution, 13 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 387, 388 (1993) (contrasting the Connecticut
exclusionary rule with the federal exclusionary rule).
121. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1012-13. For the purposes of its analysis, the court as
sumed that the police possessed sufficient probable cause at the time of the chemical
analysis that Joyce had started the fire. [d. at 1013.
122. [d. at 1013 (citing State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 750 (Conn. 1993) (apply
ing two part subjective/objective standard for determining whether defendant possessed
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his garbage placed at the curbside)).
123. [d. (citing State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 155 (Conn.) (police were entitled
to seize a homeless person's unattended possessions upon probable cause and preserve
them while securing a proper search warrant, but the warrantless search of these posses
sions was a violation of Fourth Amendment rights), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991)).
124. [d. For example, the State argued that Joyce's conduct of saturating his
clothes with gasoline removed any expectation of privacy he may have possessed in
them because such conduct exhibited no intent to keep such incriminating evidence
private. The majority dismissed this argument, and stated that article first, § 7 protects
all citizens, regardless of whether they are intentionally concealing crimes. [d. at 1013
14.
The State also argued that any odor of gasoline emanating from Joyce's clothing
would eradicate his expectation of privacy, but the majority dismissed this argument
since no witnesses had testified that they had smelled gasoline in the clothing. [d. at
1014 n.14.
125. [d. at 1014.
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would be unreasonable and that Joyce's inactivity in no way mani
fested any intention to surrender his expectation of privacy,126 The
majority concluded that Joyce had "merely left his property behind
him, more or less of necessity, making no attempt to discard it or
disassociate it from himself."127
Justice Berdon additionally refuted an argument, raised later
by Justice Callahan in dissent, that defendant's reasonable expecta
tion of privacy in the clothing was necessarily diminished because it
was so badly burned and damaged. l28 Justice Berdon reasoned that
the physical condition of personal property is immaterial to the
ownership of the property and thus irrelevant to whether a suspect
possesses an expectation of privacy over such property.129 The ma
jority found that "[a]lthough the items of clothing tested at the state
laboratory were unusable as clothing and reduced to rags, they
were still [Joyce's] rags."130 The court relied upon State v. Zin
dros,131 which held that the burnt condition of a building following
a fire did not diminish an arson suspect's reasonable expectation of
privacy in the building. 132 Thus, by analogy, the majority concluded
that Joyce did possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
burnt clothing, thereby entitling him to the protection of the war
rant requirement. 133
Justice Berdon next asserted that the chemical analysis of the
clothing performed at the state laboratory constituted a search. l34
He explained that the elaborate process involved in gas chromatog
raphy, as evidenced by the detailed testimony of the head of the
chemical department at the forensic laboratory, uncovered "private
facts" about Joyce,135 Justice Berdon distinguished such a personal
126. Id. at 1014 n.13 (citing Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159-60 ("[N]o element of con
duct manifesting a temporary intent to relinquish an expectation of privacy ... [and] of
course, no contrary intent can be inferred from the fact that the police arrested
[Mooney] and thus prevented him from returning ... that night."».
127. Id. at 1014 (quoting State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844, 855 (Me. 1981) (holding
that the defendant, who was injured, did not abandon his expectation of privacy in his
knapsack when he unintentionally left it behind at the accident scene».
128. Id. See infra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
129. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1014.
130. Id. The court further illustrated this point by noting that Joyce's wristwatch
was later found undamaged inside the pocket of his burned shirt. Id. at 1014 n.15.
131. 456 A.2d 288 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
132. Id. at 295-96. See infra note 152 for further discussion of Zindros.
133. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1015.
134. Id.
135. To illustrate the "personal nature" of such private facts, the head of the
chemistry department of the state forensic laboratory included documentation that the
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type of analysis from the field test for cocaine in United States v.
Jacobsen,136 which revealed no private facts about the defendant.
In addition, Justice Berdon found that, unlike the field test in Ja
cobsen, which indicated the presence of only one substance (co
caine), the chemical analysis performed in Joyce was capable of
detecting "the presence and identity of many organic sub
stances."137 Thus, the majority concluded that the chemical analysis
of the clothing did constitute a search under article first, section 7 of
the Connecticut Constitution.138
Finally, Justice Berdon asserted that the search performed on
Joyce's clothing could not have been performed legally without a
warrant. 139 The majority relied on the established notion that the
state constitutional preference requires the police to procure a war
rant prior to performing a search.140 Furthermore, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of a few
specifically established exceptions. 141 Such exceptions are primarily
limited to the acknowledged interests in protecting the safety of the
police, the safety of the public, or in preventing the destruction of
evidence. 142 The majority determined that no exception permitted
the warrantless search of Joyce's clothing.1 43
In sum, finding that (1) Joyce possessed a reasonable expecta
gas chromatography detected the presence of "an organic material in the defendant's
underwear that was not an accelerant." [d. at 1015 n.16.
136. 466 u.s. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a field test which specifically checks
for the presence of cocaine, but reveals no private facts about the individual, violates no
legitimate expectation of privacy and, therefore, does not constitute a "search" under
the Fourth Amendment).
137. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1015 n.17.
138. [d. at 1015.
139. [d.
140. [d. Such a preference is designed to reflect the goal of "protecting citizens
from unjustified police intrusions by interposing a neutral decisionmaker between the
police and the object of the proposed search." [d. (citing State v. Diaz, 628 A.2d 567
(Conn. 1993».
141. [d. at 1016. See also State v. Blades, 626 A.2d 273, 278 (Conn. 1993). See
generally Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement - The Burger Court Approach, 53 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 691 (1982) (stating that the language of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution creates a strong presumption of requiring a warrant).
142. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1016 (citing State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315 (Conn. 1993».
See generally H. Patrick Furman, The Exigent Circumstances Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, 20 CoLO. LAW. 1167, 1168 (1991).
143. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1016. In a motion to suppress evidence acquired through
a warrantless search, the state bears the burden of proving that the particular facts fit
into an exception to the warrant requirement. [d. at 1016 n.19 (citing State v. Cope
land, 530 A.2d 603 (Conn. 1987». In Joyce, the State argued that the "evaporative
properties of gasoline" created an exigent circumstance for a warrantless search. [d. at
1016 n.19. However, because this argument was not presented to the trial court, the
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tion of privacy in his clothing, (2) the chemical analysis of the cloth
ing constituted an unreasonable search, and (3) the circumstances
of the case did not fall under a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement, the majority concluded that "the chemical analysis of
[Joyce's] clothing should have been suppressed as the result of a
warrantless search unsupported by exigent circumstance or any
other recognized exception to the warrant requirement."l44 Ac
cordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court
and remanded the case for a new trial. 145
2.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Callahan dissented from the majority opinion because
he determined that Joyce did not possess a "reasonable expectation
of privacy in the burnt remnants of his clothing."146 The dissent
opined that "any expectation of privacy that [Joyce] may have had
in his clothing was diminished by virtue of their condition and their
treatment."147 Justice Callahan reasoned that an expectation of pri
vacy in clothing necessarily diminishes when it has been severely
burned and left along a public road. 148 Furthermore, even if Joyce
had manifested that he himself possessed an expectation of privacy
in his burnt clothing, such an expectation would not be recognized
by society as reasonable. 149
The dissent criticized the majority's use of State v. Zindros .150
Justice Callahan agreed with the holding in Zindros, concluding
that a person's expectation of privacy in property does not disap
pear merely because the property becomes damaged. 151 However,
he distinguished the facts of Joyce from those of Zindros. The Zin
dros court based its conclusion on the facts that Zindros secared
and locked the building each time he left it and continued to store
valuable merchan~ise in the building despite its burnt condition. 152
majority declined to consider it. Id. at 1016 (citing State v. Reagan, 546 A.2d 839
(Conn. 1988), cert. denied, 559 A.2d 1139 (1989)).
144. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1017.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1017 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 456 A.2d 288 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
151. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1017 (citing Zindros, 456 A.2d at 295-96).
152. Id. at 1017-18 (citing Zindros, 456 A.2d at 295-96). Zindros had leased the
premises in question, which he utilized as a pizza parlor. After the fire, Zindros said he
wished to keep the premises because he intended to repair the premises and reopen his
business. No action was taken by the owner of the premises to terminate Zindros'

1996]

WHO GETS BURNED?

325

Therefore, although damaged by fire, the building' was still func
tional as a storage place for Zindros' personal belongings. The dis
sent contrasted this with the facts of Joyce, in which the fire had left
the clothing unusable I53 and no evidence whatsoever existed that
Joyce had expressed or exhibited an interest in the burnt
remains. 154
The dissent further asserted that Joyce's clothing was left on
the side of a public road, readily accessible to the public and law
enforcement personnel, and that such abandonment "can amount
to a loss of any justified expectation of privacy."155 Thus, the dis
sent argued that Joyce's actions, or more specifically, his lack of
action, resulted in the effective abandonment of his clothing and,
accordingly, the forfeiture of his expectation of privacy in the
clothing. 156
Justice Callahan additionally argued that Joyce did not retain a
privacy expectation in his burnt clothing "merely because a police
officer, rather than a passerby, happened to retrieve the remnants
from the roadside."157 The dissent relied on State v. DeFusco,15s
which held that whether or not an expectation of privacy is objec
tively reasonable "cannot, logically, depend on the source of the
intrusion on his or her privacy."159
Finally, the dissent maintained that the fact that the clothing
constituted incriminating evidence did not by itself create an expec
tation of privacy in the clothing. l60 Justice Callahan relied upon
Rakas v. Illinois,161 in which the United States Supreme Court
lease, which was paid in full through the end of the month. Zindros testified that he felt
he had a right to be on the premises since his rent was paid and that he intended to
keep other people out of the building unless they had first gained his permission to
enter. Zindros, 456 A.2d at 296.
153. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1017-18 (citing State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872, 875 n.6
(Conn. App. Ct. 1993)).
154. Id. at 1018. The dissent pointed out that Joyce did exhibit a subjective ex
pectation of privacy once the trial began and the results from the chemical analysis were
to be introduced into evidence. Id. Judge Callahan contrasted this with the fact that
Joyce's wallet was retrieved from the police by his wife the day after the fire, clearly
exhibiting an immediate expectation of privacy in the wallet. Id. at 1018 n.l.
155. Id. at 1018 (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 35, § 2.6 (Supp. 1994)).
156. Id. See, e.g., Sullivan v. District Court of Hampshire, 429 N.E.2d 335, 338-39
(Mass. 1981) (hospital employee retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in jacket
left in public canteen area).
157. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018.
158. 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993).
159. Id. at 753.
160. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018.
161. 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
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noted that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable a de
fendant's subjective expectation of privacy in incriminating evi
dence. 162 Thus, even if Joyce did possess a subjective expectation of
privacy, such an expectation is not one which society would recog
nize as reasonable. In sum, Justice Callahan concluded that Joyce's
privacy expectations failed the two prong Katz test,163 and that, ac
cordingly, no warrant should have been required, the search should
have been ruled proper, and the evidence from the chromatography
should have been admitted.
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Both the majority and the dissent in Joyce agreed that in order
to determine whether an individual possessed a legitimate expecta
tion of privacy, the particular facts of the case must demonstrate
that (1) the individual manifested a subjective expectation of pri
vacy and (2) that the expectation is one which society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. 164 The justices of the Connecticut
Supreme Court disagreed, however, when they applied the facts in
Joyce to this rule.
In the most general sense, the majority and dissent disagreed
on whether the defendant possessed a protected interest in the
burnt clothing. 165 Justice Berdon asserted that the defendant did
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
clothing,166 while Justice Callahan claimed that he did not. 167 The
justices' opinions diverged on three distinct issues.
First, Justices Berdon and Callahan disagreed as to whether
fire~damaged clothing removed from a burn victim's body and left
behind at the accident site should be categorically excluded from
the protection of article first, section 7. In other words, is Joyce's
burnt clothing more analogous to garbage, which can never be the
object of a legitimate privacy expectation, regardless of the steps
162. Id. at 143 n.12 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
163. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for discussion of the two prongs of
the Katz test.
164. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d
746, 750 (Conn. 1993).
165. The majority and dissent did not disagree that the chemical analysis
amounted to a search, and that no exception to the warrant requirement was applicable.
These issues, therefore, are not discussed.
166. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1016-17.
167. Id. at 1017.
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taken by the person in order to manifest a privacy expectation,168 or
to a fire-damaged building, which warrants constitutional protec
tion as long as a legitimate expectation of privacy IS
demonstrated?169
Second, the justices disagreed as to whether a privacy interest
in clothing that is damaged in an arson related fire is necessarily lost
because the clothing is used as an instrument of crime. In other
words, is gasoline saturated clothing analogous to contraband,
which can never itself be the object of a legitimate expectation of
privacy due to its criminal character?170
Finally, assuming that neither of the above categorical charac
terizations disqualified any legitimate expectation of privacy in the
clothing, Justices Berdon and Callahan disagreed as to whether
Joyce nonetheless had abandoned the clothing, thereby forfeiting
any privacy expectations he may have possessed in it.l7l
A.

Whether Burned Clothing Should Be Categorically Excluded
from the Protection of Article First, Section 7
1.

Is Burnt Clothing Analogous to Garbage?

In State v. DeFusco,l72 the Connecticut Supreme Court held
that a defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
garbage placed at the curbside for collection. 173 The court reasoned
that when garbage is placed at the curb, it generally becomes widely
susceptible to invasion from a variety of intruders, such as munici
pal workers, antique collectors, bottle or coupon redeemers,
snoops, vagrants, and animals. 174 Given this common knowledge of
168. See, e.g., DeFusco, 620 A.2d at 753 (no reasonable expectation of privacy in
garbage placed at the curbside for pickup).
169. See, e.g., State v. Zindros, 456 A.2d 288, 296-97 (Conn. 1983) (holding that
the lessee of a building sufficiently demonstrated that he still possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the building eleven days after it was destroyed by fire), cen.
denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a
test that indicates the presence of cocaine does not violate a legitimate expectation of
privacy); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that society is not pre
pared to recognize an expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence).
171. See, e.g., State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 159 (Conn.) (stating that abandon
ment of an expectation of privacy requires the relinquishment of that expectation in the
object in question), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991); State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844,
854-55 (Me. 1981) (holding that an injured defendant did not abandon his expectation
of privacy in his knapsack when he unintentionally left it behind at the accident scene).
172. 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993).
173. Id. at 753.
174. Id. at 752 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,40 (1988) (prior to
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the high susceptibility of such property to invasion, the Connecticut
Supreme Court determined that individuals cannot possess a rea
sonable expectation of privacy in their curbside garbagePS
Although the argument was not directly addressed by the opin
ions in Joyce, it is worth noting that Joyce's burnt clothing, left on
the side of a public road, was susceptible to the same invasions out
lined by the court in DeFusco. Specifically, prior to being picked
up by the pOlice, the discarded clothing was readily available to in
trusion by either passersby or animals.
To argue that the clothing's susceptibility to invasion was
enough to divest the defendant of a reasonable expectation of pri
vacy, however, misapplies DeFusco. The language used by the
DeFusco court states that its holding applies to "garbage placed at
the curb for collection."176 The fact that the property was located
at the curbside, therefore, provided notice to others that it was in
deed garbage.!77 The DeFusco court stated, in fact, that changes in
the location of the garbage would raise issues beyond the scope of
its holdingPS Thus, the fact that Joyce's clothing was not placed at
the curbside, nor any other location that, by itself, would categorize
the property as garbage, distinguishes it from the property in
DeFusco, the United States Supreme Court reached a nearly identical holding when
presented with a set of facts».
175. Id. at 753. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in contrast, has held that curb
side garbage should receive protection against warrantless police searches. See State v.
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793,804 (N.J. 1990) (holding that individuals may reasonably pos
sess a different expectation of privacy with respect to police as compared to other
intruders).
The California Supreme Court similarly held in favor of a warrant requirement in
People v. Krivda, 486P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971) (en bane) (holding that an individual pos
sesses a reasonable expectation that police officers will not rummage through their gar
bage without a warrant), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 1068 (1972),
but its decision has been weakened by an amendment to the California Constitution
which limits a criminal defendant's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures to the level afforded by the federal constitution. See Gerald F. Uelmen, The
California Constitution After Proposition /15, in 3 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTI
TUTIONAL LAW 33, 40 (1990).
A minority of states have required warrants as a result of unique constitutional
provisions. See, e.g., State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Wash. 1990) (en bane) (hold
ing that a warrantless search of trash violated article first, § 7 of the Washington Consti
tution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law"). Warrants have also been required due to the
particular circumstances of the case presented. See, e.g., State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274
(Haw. 1985) (warrant required when police trespassed across individual's property to
seize garbage).
176. DeFusco, 620 A.2d at 752.
177. Id. at 748.
178. Id. at 752.
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DeFusco. In addition, the physical appearance of the property in
question in DeFusco, i.e., closed plastic bags, could leave little
doubt to a passerby that the intent was to throw it away. The ap
pearance of the burnt clothing in Joyce, however, afforded a less
clear indication of the owner's intentions to an observer. In other
words, the burnt appearance did not necessarily indicate that the
clothing was intended to be garbage. For example, an individual
may place great sentimental value on burnt clothing as a memento
of some significant event, such as the survival of a fire or the death
of a loved one. To this "sentimental owner," the burnt condition of
the clothing certainly does not render the property as garbage.
Therefore, although susceptible to the same types of invasions,
the distinct locations of the property in question, the dissimilar
physical characteristics, and the uncertainty of its value to its owner
r~moves the burnt clothing from the exception allowing the war
rantless search and seizure of garbage. Burnt clothing may indeed
be reduced to little more than garbage, but nonetheless it is distinct
from the Connecticut Supreme Court's intended meaning of "gar
bage" in DeFusco. 179

2.

Is Burnt Clothing Analogous to a Fire-Damaged
Building?

The most significant divergence between the majority and dis
senting opinions in Joyce surrounds whether the burnt and dam
aged condition of the clothing necessarily diminished any
expectation of privacy that Joyce may have possessed in them. In
other words, can an individual reasonably possess a legitimate ex
pectation of privacy in burnt clothing?
Justice Berdon answered this question in the affirmative, plac
ing greater significance on the property interest in the clothing than
on its condition,180 In other words, the Joyce majority essentially
equated ownership of property with an expectation of privacy, sug
gesting that Joyce's ownership of the burnt clothing was dispositive
of the argument that its burnt condition did not diminish Joyce's
reasonable expectation of privacy over it. This argument, however,
is a non sequitur. Courts have held, for example, that a person who
possesses an ownership interest in a particular piece of property
179. See, id. at 752-53.
180. State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007, 1014 (Conn. 1994) ("Although the items of
clothing ... were unusable as clothing and reduced to rags, they were still the defend
.
ant's rags."). Id.
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does not necessarily possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that same property.1 81 For example, individuals never possess a
reasonable expectation of privacy in property located in open
fields,182 regardless of the person's ownership interest in the prop
erty. Ownership is only one of many factors to consider when eval
uating an expectation of privacy in property. Therefore, Justice
. Berdon's emphasis on ownership seems misplaced, and the more
appropriate question is whether the clothing falls under a categori
cal exception where no reasonable expectation of privacy can be
recognized.
In State v. Zindros, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that
an individual maintained an expectation of privacy in a burned-out
building. 183 The Joyce majority relied on Zindros to show that fire
damage does not diminish an individual's expectation of privacy in
that property.l84 Such a broad application of Zindros, however,
was heavily criticized by the Joyce dissent. 18s Justice Callahan dis
tinguished Zindros from Joyce by arguing that the damaged build
ing in Zindros was still useful as a storage faciIity.186 Furthermore,
Zindros manifested his expectation of privacy in the building after
the damage occurred by continuing to lock the building each time
he left it. 187 In contrast, the clothing in Joyce was rendered
unusable 188 by the fire, and Joyce did nothing to exhibit any expec
tation of privacy in the clothing. 189
The burnt clothing in Joyce is more analogous to the burnt
181. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980); United States v.
Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1989); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 158
(Conn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991). For a discussion on how property rights are
related to Fourth Amendment rights, see Steinberg, supra note 14, at 1521-23.
182. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (United States
Supreme Court held that society has no interest in protecting the privacy of property
located in an open field setting); Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152.
183. 456 A.2d 288, 295-96 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). See
supra note 152 and accompanying text.
184. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1014-15. A related issue arose recently State v. Bernier,
No. CR 1871493 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995), reprinted in 2 CONN. OPS. 98 (Janu
ary 29, 1996), in which the Connecticut State Police, without procuring a search war
rant, used a trained dog to detect accelerants in charred floor sections of the
defendant's fire-damaged home. The judge, relying heavily on Joyce, found that the
State violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in his living room
floor. Id. For a discussion of how Bernier relates to Joyce, see generally Lucia J. Wol
gast, Seize But Don't Test Withouta Warrant, 2 CONN. Ops. 89 (January 29,1996).
185. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1017-18 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 1018.
187. Id. See supra note 152 for a description of the facts of Zindros.
188. State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872, 875 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
189. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018.
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building in Zindros than Justice Callahan suggested. In his descrip
tion of Joyce's clothing as "no longer usable as SUCh,"l90 Justice Cal
lahan was probably referring to its lack of usefulness as a wearable
garment. However, this characterization of the "use" of clothing
may have been too narrow. For example, clothing may additionally
be used for the temporary storage of one's personal belongings,
such as money, keys, handkerchiefs, etc. Indeed, the defendant's
shirt, in Joyce, albeit burnt and tom, contained a working wrist
watch in its pocket when entered into evidence at trial. 191 Thus,
although damaged (and presumably no longer wearable), the cloth
ing still offered a valuable use to the defendant as a personal depos
itory. This is similar to the burnt building in Zindros, which in the
words of Justice Callahan, "was being used as a depository for [Zin
dros'] personal property."l92
Of course, even clothing's potential use as storage could be lost
if it were severely or totally burned severely.193 For example, if
clothing is reduced to a mere pile of ashes, it would seem unreason
able to argue that such "clothing" retained any practical use. Such
complete destruction seems analogous to the uselessness that is fre
quently attached to completely incinerated buildings. For example,
in Michigan v. Clifford,l94 Justice Powell stated that as long as the
reasonable expectations of privacy remained in a burnt building, a
search of such a fire-damaged building required a warrant. 195 Jus
tice Powell's initial caveat suggests that this rule would not apply
absent an expectation of privacy in the building. A building re
duced to a pile of ashes, therefore, would not receive protection
under Clifford; any claim of an expectation of privacy would be
deemed unreasonable. l96
190. [d. (Callahan, J., dissenting). Consistent with Justice Callahan's description,
the trial court had described the clothing as "torn [and) unusable" at the motion to
suppress hearing. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 875 n.6.
191. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1014 n.15.
192. [d. at 1018 (Callahan, J., dissenting). In Zindros, the defendant continued to
store approximately $6750 worth of merchandise in the burned out building. State v.
Zindros, 456 A.2d 288, 296 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied,465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
193. However, as discussed previously, even severely burned clothing could retain
some sentimental value to its owner despite its lack of "practical usefulness."
194. 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
195. [d. at 292-93. See also, Michigan v. lYler, 436 U.S. 499, 511-12 (1978) (re
quiring a warrant to search burned-out house anytime after the initial entry to extin
guish the fire).
196. See LAFAVE, supra note 35, § 10.4 ("fires may be so devastating that no
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's sub
jective expectations").
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In sum, a burned-out building seems to become divested of an
expectation of privacy when it is so badly burned that it ceases to
exist as a building. Accordingly, it follows that clothing also be
comes divested of an expectation of privacy when it ceases to exist
as clothing. In his dissent in Joyce, Justice Callahan argued that the
clothing was burned to a point of uselessness,197 but a broader view
point of clothing's potential uses suggests that it may not have
been.1 98
B.

Whether an Expectation of Privacy in Clothing That Is
Damaged in an Arson Related Fire Is Necessarily Lost
Because the Clothing Is Used as an Instrument of
Crime

In the final words of his dissent, Justice Callahan stated that
"an expectation of privacy does not attach to property merely be
cause it may constitute incriminating evidence."l99 Although the
Rakas v. Illinois holding was intended to apply to a defendant's
standing,200 Justice Callahan's attempt to equate Joyce with Rakas
raises an interesting question: Is gasoline saturated clothing analo
gous to contraband, which can never itself be the object of a legiti
mate expectation of privacy due to its instrumentality to a crime?201
Although the gasoline saturated clothing in this case was simi
lar to illegal drugs due to its value as evidence of criminal activity,
the parallel ends there. Unlike drugs, Joyce's clothing itself was not
the instrument of any crime. Presumably, Joyce' did not intend to
use his clothing to facilitate an illegal act, i.e., burn the house down.
It is much more likely that gasoline, which was used to burn the
house, spilled onto the clothing accidently. Thus, while the gasoline
may have been an instrument of crime, Joyce's clothing was not.
Accordingly, Joyce's clothing was not divested of its constitutional
protection due to any criminal instrumentality.
Similarly, the terin "contraband" itself indicates a significant
197. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
199. State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007, 1018 (Conn. 1994) (Callahan, J., dissenting)
(citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978» (noting that society is not pre
pared to recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence).
200. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
201. The United States Supreme Court has determined that an individual cannot
possess an expectation of privacy in illegal contraband itself. See, e.g., United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (a test which indicates the presence of cocaine does
not violate a legitimate expectation of privacy); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983) (no expectation of privacy in cocaine detected by canine sniff).
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distinction between it and gasoline soaked clothing.. Simply pos
sessing contraband is illegal. Possession of gasoline soaked cloth
ing, in contrast, is not. Automobile mechanics, for instance,
certainly spill gasoline on their clothing on occasion, but possession
of such property in no way indicates criminal activity. Simply
stated, gasoline is not contraband. Thus, the gasoline saturated
clothing in Joyce is clearly distinguishable from the cocaine in
United States v. Jacobsen 202 and United States v. Place,z03 and the
guns in Rakas v. Illinois ,204 all of which the Supreme Court deter
mined incapable of being the object of a legitimate expectation of
privacy.20s Thus, even if the gasoline contained in the clothing indi
cates criminal behavior, such an intimation does not divest the
clothing's owner of an expectation of privacy in it.
C.

Whether Joyce Forfeited His Expectation of Privacy Through
Abandonment

To test whether property has been abandoned, it must be de
termined whether the owner or possessor relinquished his expecta
tion of privacy in the property.206 Once abandonment is
established, the law holds that no warrant is required for the police
to search or seize the property.207 As previously discussed, the
clothing in Joyce was not divested of Joyce's expectation of privacy
by virtue of its location or condition. The question remains, how
ever, whether Joyce relinquished his expectation of privacy by some
other factual circumstance.
First, Joyce may have relinquished his expectation of privacy
when he allowed his clothing to be removed from his body. In Hes
ter v. United States ,z08 the United States Supreme Court stated that
no warrant is required for the police to seize property that is "aban
202. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
203. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
204. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
205. See supra note 201.

206. See State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 158-59 (Conn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919
(1991). See supra part I.C.2 for detailed discussion of Mooney.
207. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (holding that de
fendant's papers discovered in the wastebasket of his vacated hotel room were not pro
tected by the Fourth Amendment). See also Steinberg, supra note 181, at 1529 ("One
cannot manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item once it has been aban
doned."); Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search and
Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 400 (1971)
("[W]here one abandons property, he is said to bring his right of privacy therein to an
end ....").
208. 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (Fourth Amendment did not prohibit pOlice from secur
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doned" bya·defendant.209 Hester, however, is distinct from Joyce in
two significant ways. First, Joyce's clothing was removed in order
to treat an injury. Thus, the intention in removing the clothing was
not to rid Joyce of his property, but to attend to his wounds. 210 Sec
ond, Joyce's clothing was removed by a third party,211 not by Joyce
himself.212 Although Joyce was apparently conscious and did not
resist the removal of his burnt clothing by paramedics,213 it seems a
stretch to argue that he made a cognizant decision to relinquish any
expectation of privacy he may have had in his clothing.214 In this
way, Joyce is similar to State v. Philbrick,215 in which the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine held that an accident victim did not forfeit
his reasonable expectation of privacy in his unintentionally aban
doned knapsack. The Philbrick court reasoned that the defendant
had not intended "to discard it or disassociate [the knapsack] from
himself."216 In the same way, Joyce did not intend to disassociate
his burnt clothing from himself either. Accordingly, he did not for
feit, or abandon, his expectation of privacy in the clothing.
An alternative argument for abandonment, raised in Justice
Callahan's dissent, is that Joyce did not exhibit any interest in the
burnt clothing until the laboratory results were about to be intro
duced into evidence.217 Thus, Joyce in no way manifested a subjec
tive expectation of privacy. It seems unfair, however, to apply this
argument in this case, because public policy brands it unreasonable
to require a person to affirmatively manifest an expectation of pri
ing a bottIe after suspect dropped it), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981).
209. Id. at 58 ("[T]here was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers
examined the [property] after it had been abandoned.").
210. State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872, 875 n.5 (Conn. App. Q. 1993). The paramedic
who treated Joyce explained that the burnt clothing was removed to prevent it from
sticking to the open blisters and third degree bums and to prevent infection from the
dirty lake water.
211. Id. at 875.
212. Contra Hester, 265 U.S. at 58 ("The defendant's own acts, and those of his
associates, disclosed the [property].").
213. Id.
214. The Joyce majority rejected the State's abandonment argument on grounds
of public policy, noting that it would be unreasonable to require Joyce to express some
expectation of privacy when his clothes were being removed from his body by
paramedics for medical reasons or while he lay in the hospital immediately thereafter.
State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007, 1014 n.13 (Conn. 1994).
215. 436 A.2d 844, 855 (Me. 1981).
216. Id.
217. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
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vacy in his property while in a hospital recovering from injury.218
Justice Callahan's argument becomes more plausible, however,
in light of the fact that Joyce not only failed to manifest a privacy
expectation while in the hospital, but also during the months fol
lowing his release and right up until the moment of trial.2 19 Ulti
mately, however, this argument must fail, for the legality of a search
cannot depend upon what happens after the search has concluded.
To allow this would create a standard impossible for police to fol
low and would thus undermine the warrant requirement. The Con
necticut Supreme Court imposes a strong preference for warrants,
reflecting a goal of "protecting citizens from unjustified police in
trusions by interposing a neutral decisionmaker between the police
and the object of the proposed search."220
CONCLUSION

The defendant in Joyce did indeed possess a protected interest
in the burnt clothing under article first, section 7 of the Connecticut
Constitution. In determining whether the "owner" of burnt cloth
ing maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy, burnt clothing is
analogous to a burned-out building in that the severity of the dam
age is significant in evaluating whether the owner possesses an ex
pectation of privacy in the remains of the clothing. It is
distinguishable from garbage in that the physical condition or loca
tion of the burnt clothing does not necessarily divest its owner of
any possible legitimate expectation of privacy. Thus, barring the
total destruction of the clothing, which would make any expectation
of privacy objectively unreasonable, or the absolute relinquishment
of any subjective expectation of privacy by the owner, article first,
section 7 requires the police to obtain a warrant before they can
218. In his dissent to the appellate court decision, Judge Heiman went as far as to
label such a requirement "Orwellian." State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872, 883 n.3 (Conn.
App. Q. 1993) (Heiman, J., dissenting).
219. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018 (Callahan, J., dissenting). Justice Callahan bolsters
his argument by noting that although no attempt was made to pick up the clothes from
the police station, Joyce's wife did pick up his wallet the day after the accident. ld. at
1018 n.l. Presumably, Justice Callahan'S argument infers that Joyce's wife's failure to
pick up the burnt clothing while she was already at the police station retrieving her
husband's other personal property constituted an abandonment of the clothing on
Joyce's behalf. However, while such an abandonment argument does possess a logical
flow, it nonetheless rests on a far broader application of third party consent than the
United States Supreme Court has warranted. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164 (1974).
220. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1015 (quoting State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1324 (Conn.
1993)).
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submit burnt clothing to chemical analysis. The damaged nature of
the clothing does not render it unprotected.
This rule holds true even when police legally secure burnt
clothing in a lawful manner pursuant to their community caretaking
function. The community caretaking function provides the police
with only limited custodial rights and cannot be used as a substitute
for procuring a valid warrant. Thus, when the police in Joyce trans
ported the clothing to the forensic laboratory for chemical analysis,
they effectively removed their caretaking hats and replaced them
with those of criminal investigators. The Connecticut Constitution
requires a search warrant to be procured before such investigatory
activities may take place, and the police's failure to do so must re
sult in the suppression of such evidence.
Andrew S. Golden

